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THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN
THE LEASE OF A FURNISHED HOME
The general rule in regard to the suitability of leased premises is
so fundamental as to scarcely require remark. "One taking a lease of
premises is in the position of a purchaser and the rule of caveat emptor
applies to him. It results that there is no implied warranty by the
lessor as to the condition of the premises, and the lessee cannot ordi-
narily complain that they were not, at the beginning of the tenancy, in
a tenantable condition, or were not adapted to the purpose for which
they were leased."1 Dwelling houses as well as other real property
naturally fall under this rule.2 Of course, it is obvious that an
express covenant of habitability in any such lease will protect the
tenant, but unless there is such a covenant or unless there has been such
misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the lessor as would vitiate the
contract, the tenant has no remedy if he discovers after the lease is
made that his home is unsuitable as a place in which to live.
However, when we come to the case of a furnished house, we find
that some jurisdictions introduce an important qualification into this
general rule, and hold that in the lease of a furnished house there is
an implied warranty of habitability. In so doing, these courts follow
the English case of Smith v. Marrable, decided in 1843, in which
the lessee of a furnished summer cottage refused to remain in it be-
cause it was infested with bed bugs. The Court flatly held, on the
authority of some Nisi Prius cases,' that there was an implied obli-
gation on the part of the lessor to have a furnished house in a habitable
condition, but gave no reasons for its decision.
In the same year the case of Sutton v. Temple5 came up in
which Smith v. Marrable was cited as authority for the broad statement
that there was an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose intended
in any demise of real property. Lord Abinger, who had taken part
in the decision in the previous case, overruled it as authority for any
such broad doctrine and distinguished the two cases, limiting the rule
of implied warranty. He pointed out that the lease of a furnished
house was a mixed lease of realty and personalty. In the sale of a
chattel there is an implied fitness for the purpose intended, and he
placed the burden on the lessor of seeing that proper furniture was
1. Tiffany on Real Property, p. 136. 3. 11 M. & W. 6.
2. 24 App. D. C. 532. 4. Ry. & M. 268.
185 Mass. 341. 1 M. & Rob. 112.
57 N.Y.S. 79. 5. 12 M.&W. 52.
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provided. It is worth noting that the fault in Smith v. Marrable was
in the furniture and not in the realty. There is no indication of what
the ruling might have been had the roof leaked, or the drains been
choked, or something else wrong with the realty itself. The New
Jersey Court, in Murray v. Albertson," in 1887, overruling Smith
v. Marrable as good law, in that State, pointed this out and dis-
tinguished it from the earlier case on the grounds that such an implied
warranty based on those grounds could not exist in the case of a house
with the basement full of water for the fault was in the realty itself.
However, when that case of the non-habitability of the realty, as dis-
tinct from its furniture arose in the English Courts in Wilson v. Finch-
Hatton,' the Court held that there was an implied warranty, but
changed the grounds of its decision to the point that the tenant had a
right of possession for a short time only, and the chief value of his
lease was in his ability to enter into possession at once, and the lessor
was expected to know this.
This is the chief ground of American decisions supporting this doc-
trine. The ruling case in this country is Ingall v. Hobbs.8 Here,
by dicta, the Court admitted the general rule that there is no implied
warranty of habitability in a dwelling house, but decided that it should
be qualified in the case of a furnished house leased for a short term.
Stress was laid on the fact that an important item in persuading one to
take such a lease was his ability to use the premises at once, and the
lessor, knowing this, impliedly warrants that such premises are fit for
immediate habitation. In Young v. Povich 9, the Maine Court held
that there was such an implied warranty on the grounds of Ingalls
v. Hobbs, quoting from it at length and then proceeding to define what
was meant by a "short term." It held that the words used should prop-
erly be "for a temporary purpose" which meant the lease of a furnished
house for transient use for a season as distinguished from a permanent
year round place of abode. The Court held that a three months summer
season was sufficient to raise the warranty. In New York, the Court
of Appeals held in the case of Morgantheu v. Erich10 , that the unsuit-
ability of a house leased for the winter season of five months caused
by such an infestation of bed bugs as to make life miserable for the
tenant amounted to a constructive eviction by the landlord.
This doctrine seems fixed 'n these jurisdictions as well as in Pennsyl-
6. 50 N. J. L. 167.
7. 2 Ex. D. 336.
8. 156 Mass. 348.
9. 121 Me. 141.
10. 77 Misc. (N. Y.) 139.
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vania where, although it has never come before the Supreme Court, an
inferior court has upheld it." Illinois, by a recent decision, has opened
the way in that State for an extension there of the doctrine. In that
case, a store building which was to be leased for a shoe store was
found not to be suitable for that purpose and it was held that it was
the legal duty of the lessor to put the premises in a tenantable condi-
tion for the purpose intended, and the tenant was under no obligation
to accept them unless they were in such condition." This overruled
a contrary opinion by the Appellate Court of that State." The Court
cites no authorities nor does it give any reasoning on which its de-
cision is based. It will be noted that this is a broader application of
the doctrine than any of the previous cases.
Even in those jurisdictions where it is firmly established, however.
the courts have consistently refused to extend the doctrine beyond a
lease for a furnished house for a short term. This began with the early
English cases, for in Hart v. Windsor 1 . decided the same year with
Smith v. Marrable and Sutton v. Temple. the Court refused to imply
such a warranty in the case of an unfurnished house and has con-
sistently held to that limit." The New York case of Franklin v.
Brown 16, in which the dwelling was made uninhabitable by offensive
odors from causes off the premises and outside the landlord's con-
trol, in which it was held not to come under the implied warranty of
habitability, is illustrative of this tendency to set limits to the doctrine.
This case was also distinguished by the fact that the lease was for a
full year instead of a "short term."
There seems to be no direct ruling on such an implied warranty in
regard to a furnished house in Missouri. although the courts have
upheld the general ruling of no implied warranty of suitability for the
purpose intended in the case of other realty than furnished houses.
In the memorandum decision in Kerr v. Merrill' 7 . the Court held that
there was no implied warranty of fitness for the purpose intended in
the lease of real property. and moreover that words in the lease de-
scriptive of the property are not a warranty that the description is a
true one. This would seem to settle the matter in Missouri for this
case appears to be the leading one on implied warranties of the condi-
tion of leased premises, being followed by a number of later ones.' 8
11. 3 Pac. Co. 271. 16. 118 N.Y. 110.
12. 132 N. E. 425. 17. 4 Mo. App. 592.
13. 216 I1. App. 282. 18. 21 Mo. App. 58.
14. 12 M. & W. 67. 28 Mo. App. 279.
15. 5 C. P. D. 507. 173 Mo. App. 722.(1881) 7 Q. B. D. 598.
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The question has been definitely decided in England by the enact-
ment of the statute of 9 Edward VII, chapter 44, sections 14 and 15,
in 1909, which raises the implication by statute of a warranty of fitness
for human habitation in the renting of any dwelling house.
It is interesting to note what some of the conditions are which have
been held to have violated this implied warranty in those jurisdictions
which enforce it. The earliest and most common cases are those where
insects, particularly bed bugs, infested the premises. 19 In Wilson v.
Finch-Hatton 20 , where the Court extended the doctrine from the furni-
ture to the realty, choked sewers and a collection of filth under the
basement floor, so that noisome odors were prevalent, were held to
raise the warranty. English cases hold that sewer gas and bugs were
a violation of the warranty 21. as was the fact a person suffering from
a communicable disease had occupied the premises just previously.22
There is a tendency in American cases on prior disease, however, to
put the decision on the ground of misrepresentation on the part of the
lessor rather than a breach of this implied warranty.2 3 New York
held that the frequent overflow of a cesspool was sufficient to cause a
breach of the warranty24, as was also the loathsome stench of the de-
caying bodies of rats which the landlord failed to remove.25
Those jurisdictions which do not recognize this doctrine base their
decisions on the grounds that a lease is a contract whose terms the
parties may vary to suit themselves, and having failed to put such a
warranty into the contract, the Courts will not amend it."'
Summing up, one may say that this doctrine of implied warranty of
habitability is an artificial one in the law of real property, which has
grown up within the last century in a very few jurisdictions and even
there is strictly limited to the case of furnished houses.
WARREN TURNER, '27.
19. Smith v. Marrable, supra.
Morgantheu v. Erich, supra.
Young v. Povich, supra.
20. 2 Ex. D. 336.
21. 3 Times L. R. 58.
22. (1923) 2 K. B. 617.
23. 112 Mass. 477.
60 N. Y. 229.
26 R. I. 129.
24. 134 App. Div. (N. Y.) 154.
25. 115 N. Y. Supp. 723.
26. 4 Mackey 82.
67 N. H. 393,
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